Researchers have increasingly used agency theory 1976). Such undervalued firms become prime takeover targets, enabling incumbent management to be to study problems arising from the separation of ownership and control in public corporations. displaced to make way for a new management team and subsequent changes in strategy. Particular attention has been paid to the role of alternative governance mechanisms in reducing Many corporate managements responded to the active takeover market of the 1980s by adopting these problems (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Kosnik, 1987; Rediker and Seth, takeover defenses, including antitakeover pro- visions. These provisions, which include poison 1994; Singh and Harianto, 1989a; .
pill adoptions and antitakeover amendments to a company's corporate charter, can increase the An important external mechanism believed to attenuate poor managerial performance is the bargaining power of incumbent corporate management and restrict the market for corporate (takover) market for corporate control (Manne, 1965) . The basic position is that the firm will be control. Hence, considerable controversy surrounds the adoption of antitakeover provisions. undervalued by the market when managers are slow to recognize changes in the environment and mod-
The adoption of antitakeover provisions has already received some research attention. A priify strategies too slowly, or when managers follow inappropriate strategies which serve mainly to pro-mary focus has been on the effects of antitakeover provisions on shareholder value, as reflected by mote their self-interests (Jensen and Meckling, the stock market reaction to announcements concerning takeover defense activity (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987 ; Malatesta studies indicate that the market reacts negatively (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) . The corporate board's primary responsibility is one of control. More to the adoption of antitakeover provisions, particularly to those provisions adopted during the specifically, the board's responsibility is to ensure that management engages in activities that maxtakeover wave of the 1980s (Mahoney and Mahoney, 1993) .
imize shareholder value. In order to fulfill this fiduciary responsibility, the board possesses the While prior empirical research has been useful in indicating that the market reacts negatively to power to hire, fire, and compensate top management, and to ratify important decisions. several antitakeover provisions, it does not provide insight on how other governance mechaSince antitakeover provisions are board-level decisions, the market reactions to these actions nisms suggested by agency theory affect the market reactions to takeover defenses. Studies thus are likely to be influenced significantly by its perception of the board's ability to protect sharefar examine the wealth effects of antitakeover provisions, viewing the influence of the market holders' interests (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Kosnik, 1990; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989 ; Mizrufor corporate control as independent of other governance mechanisms suggested by agency chi, 1983; Williamson, 1985) . Independence of the board from corporate management is theory. This independence assumption may be a problem since recent work indicates that alterna-important in enabling the board to perform its fiduciary responsibility. Two structural attributes tive governance mechanisms may substitute for, or enhance, the takeover market, even though of the corporate board are believed to reflect this independence: board composition and board they cannot completely compensate for the absence of an active takeover market (Rediker leadership structure. These attributes are examined and their impacts on market reactions to and Seth, 1995). For instance, the presence of a strong corporate board can reduce conflict of antitakeover provisions are hypothesized. interests between shareholders and managers, mitigating the need for the operation of the take-Board composition over market. In such a case, takeover defenses adopted by firms with strong boards can elicit Board composition involves the mix of inside directors (those employed by the organization in less negative reactions than those adopted by firms with weak boards where both the internal other capacities) and outside directors (Baysinger and Butler, 1985) . Greater outsider representation and external governance mechanisms are failing to reduce conflict of interests.
is often advocated since outside directors are likely to be more objective in monitoring manageThis study therefore builds on prior work on market reactions to antitakeover provisions by ment actions than inside directors (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Jensen, 1983a, 1983b ; incorporating the influence of an internal governance mechanism, the corporate board. This paper Gibbs, 1993; Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt, 1993; Pearce and Zahra, 1992 ; Schellenger, Wood, and specifically tests the proposition that a strong board is likely to reduce the negative wealth Tashakori, 1989) .
Even though the impact of increased outsider effects associated with the adoption of antitakeover provisions. The impacts of composition and representation on the outcome of board actions is less clear (Cochran, Wood, and Jones, 1985 ; leadership structure of the board on market reactions to the adoption of several antitakeover pro- Kosnik, 1987; Singh and Harianto, 1989a; Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990) , the appointment visions are studied. The antitakeover provisions are described in the Appendix.
of outside directors is used to signal the monitoring potential of the board (Weisbach, 1988) . For instance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find outsiders are appointed to the board following poor
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firm performance as measured by stock returns. Ostensibly, outside directors are appointed since
PROVISIONS
poor performance is an indication of poor management and a lack of adequate monitoring. The Within the context of agency theory, a critical internal mechanism for limiting managerial inef-appointment of outside directors also serves as a signal to the market that the board's monitoring ficiences is the corporate board of directors capacity is being strengthened. Evidence of a chairperson of the board and CEO positions either in general or within a contingency framework significant positive share price reaction to the appointment of outside directors indicates that the (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994; Kesner and Johnson, 1990; Rechner and Dalton, 1989) . The market responds favorably to such appointments (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) .
logic of this recommendation rests on the notion that when the CEO and chairperson positions are Market reactions to antitakeover provisions adopted by firms with stronger boards are likely held by one individual, the board's ability to function effectively as a governance mechanism to be viewed less unfavorably than those adopted by firms with weaker boards since monitoring by is severely curbed. In serving simultaneously as CEO and chairperson, a CEO will likely have outside members can be a partial substitute for the market for corporate control. For instance, greater stature and influence among board members (Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis, 1988) , thus Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) provide evidence that the enactment of poison pills leads to hampering the board's independent monitoring capacity (Beatty and Zajac, 1994) . The chaira positive stock price reaction when the majority of the board consists of outsiders, and a negative person of the board is responsible for setting the board agenda, scheduling regular and special stock price reaction when the majority of the board consists of insiders. This evidence suggests stockholder meetings, and monitoring board committees. These duties provide the chairperson with that outside directors are perceived to serve the interests of shareholders. Brickley and James considerable power to monitor management actions. If the CEO is vested with this power, (1987) find that outsider-dominated boards of banks located in states which restrict acquisitions the board's governing and independent auditing capacity are almost certainly compromised. (where no market for corporate control disciplines management teams) control managerial consump-Therefore, some scholars suggest that the separation of CEO and chairperson of the board helps tion of perquisites, indicating that monitoring by a strong board may substitute for that of the to align the interests of directors and stockholders, likely improving board governance (Baysinger takeover market.
An alternative argument leading to the same and Hoskisson, 1990; Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Kosnik, 1987) . hypothesis is that a majority of outsiders may create a situation where too much risk is transThere is some evidence that separation of the CEO and chairperson of the board has a positive ferred to managers. Managers, without protection, may reduce their time horizon and focus on impact on corporate board actions and firm performance (Daily and Dalton, 1994 ; Mallette and strategies that are overly risk averse and not optimal for stockholder wealth (Baysinger, Kos-Fowler, 1992; Pi and Timme, 1993; Rechner and Dalton, 1991) . 1 Moreover, in the recent past, nik, and Turk, 1991). In this situation, antitakeover provisions may be a counterbalancing device stockholder activists have pushed for a separation of CEO and chairperson positions in several to allow managers to take a longer view (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990) . Thus, market underperforming companies, such as General Motors, as a means to restore the firm's credireaction to antitakeover provisions adopted by corporate boards with a greater proportion of bility with investors. If the separation of powers can signal to stockholders the ability of the board outsiders is likely to be less negative. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
to protect stockholders' interests, then arguably antitakeover provisions adopted by such a board may be viewed more favorably relative to antiHypothesis 1: The market is likely to react less negatively to antitakeover provisions takeover provisions adopted by boards with a combined CEO-chairperson. adopted by boards with a greater proportion of outsiders on the board than to those adopted Vesting powers relating to the chairperson posiby boards with a lower proportion of outsiders.
1 However, several other studies have found performance and
Board leadership
separate CEO/chairperson to be unrelated (e.g., Baliga, Moyer, and Rao, 1996; Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1995;  A reform measure strongly advocated by some Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma, 1985; Daily and Dalton, 1992). governance researchers is the separation of the tion with the CEO already provides the protection IRRC's data is high with respect to corporate charter antitakeover provisions (Pound, 1992 : needed to encourage the CEO to make firmspecific capital investments and appropriate long-663). term investments. Additional power to corporate managements provided by antitakeover pro-Measures visions, in the case of firms where the CEO and chairperson positions are held by one individual, Dependent variable may be viewed by the market as further entrenching managements. On the other hand, The dependent variable is the market reactions or the cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) when the two positions are split, the market is likely to view the adoption of antitakeover pro-earned by shareholders accompanying the adoption of antitakeover provisions. The abnormal visions as less entrenching. This logic leads to the second hypothesis:
return, estimated using the standard event study methodology extensively used in financial economics, is the difference between the observed Hypothesis 2: The market is likely to react more negatively to antitakeover provisions return and the normal return as predicted by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The security adopted by boards chaired by the CEO than to antitakeover provisions adopted by boards market rates of return utilized in testing are taken from the CRSP (Center for Research in Security not chaired by the CEO.
Prices, University of Chicago) daily file for firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange and the National
METHOD
Association of Security Dealers.
Sample
For determining the cumulative abnormal returns, the choice of the 'event date' is important This paper's sample includes 261 Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 firms (as of 1986) that adopted (Brown and Warner, 1985) . The first public release of the information needs to be used. 486 antitakeover provisions for the 1984-88 period. In this period, the takeover wave of the Unlike many other corporate events, antitakeover proposals are rarely reported by the press 1980s peaked (Davis and Stout, 1992) . Also, the sample begins in 1984 to mark the initial adoption (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990: 149) . The first public release of information about these proof the poison pill. In terms of individual provisions, the sample includes 20 supermajority posals occurs when the firm mails the proxy statement containing the proposal to stockholders. amendments, 106 classified board amendments, 110 fair-price amendments, 21 provisions for The proxy statement mailing date is therefore utilized as the best available estimate of the date reduction in cumulative voting, 33 anti-greenmail provisions, and 196 poison pill provisions.
of the first public announcement of antitakeover amendment consideration (Jarrell and Poulsen, Antitakeover provisions data were obtained from the Investor Responsibility Research Cen-1987) . Once the announcement is made, the uncertainty regarding stockholder approval is ter's (IRRC) publication (Rosenbaum, 1987 (Rosenbaum, , 1989 . The IRRC is a Washington-based non-slight. IRRC reports that some companies employ proxy solicitation firms to assess the voting outprofit organization that currently, among other activities, follows the antitakeover proposals of come of a proposed amendment before proposing it to shareholders. If proposing an amendment 1500 of the largest American corporations, measured in terms of annual sales. 2 The accuracy of that fails is expensive, managers will not propose amendments with a high failure probability. In our sample years of 1984-88, over 95 percent 2 Since the IRRC publication follows the larger firms, most of proposed antitakeover amendments received of the firms in the current paper's sample are traded on the stockholder approval (Rosenbaum, 1987 (Rosenbaum, , 1989 Wade et al., 1990; Westphal and Zajac, 1994) . Since the independence of outside members can This paper considers an event window of 50 days before the proxy mailing date (−50) to 5 depend on who appointed them to the board, those members not appointed during the current days following the proxy mailing date (+5). An average of 27 trading days (and a median of CEO's tenure are likely to be less dependent on the CEO and current management. Third, leader-24) separates the board meeting date (when an amendment is passed) from the proxy mailing ship of the board is coded as a dummy variable [SEPARATE CEO/CHAIRPERSON]: 1, if the date (Linn and McConnell, 1983) . Although it is against SEC rules to solicit votes before the proxy CEO and chairperson of the board are held by different individuals and 0, if they are held by mailing date, the possibility remains that the board decision to propose antitakeover amend-the same individual. Data on both board composition and leadership were obtained from proxy ments is leaked to some market participants. The market returns in the −40 to −20 interval roughly statements. surround the board meeting date. If one holds to the (semistrong or strong form) efficient market Control variables hypothesis, then a longer event window is not only justified but arguably essential because new Market reactions to antitakeover provisions can depend on managerial stock ownership. Corporate information concerning antitakeover provisions is being received by the market throughout this time governance researchers argue that in the case of firms with high managerial stock ownership, period. Similar event windows are used in several other studies on antitakeover provisions (Agrawal negative stock reaction associated with reduction in perceived probability of a successful takeover and Mandelker, 1990; DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987) . is higher than the positive reaction associated with increased bargaining power (Stulz, 1988) . A time period of 50 days before the proxy mailing date is chosen to ensure the inclusion of McWilliams (1990) finds that firms with greater insider holdings experienced more negative the board meeting date. A time period of 5 days after the proxy mailing date is considered a returns. Other empirical studies, however, find no significant impact for insider holdings (Agrawal sufficient time period for the market to react fully to the antitakeover provision. Larcker (1983) and Mandelker, 1990; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987; Lauterbach, Malitz, and Vu, 1991) . In the current finds significant market reaction around the date that the SEC receives the proxy, the so-called paper, INSIDER OWNERSHIP, found in proxy statements, is measured as percentage of equity 'SEC stamp date. ' Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease (1985) find that the SEC stamp date falls, on held by inside board members including the CEO.
This measure is meant as a proxy for the econaverage, 3.2 days (median of 3.0 days) after the proxy mailing date. Therefore, the event windows omic alignment of management with other shareholders (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993; Kosnik, for the current paper are intended to give the market sufficient time to react to various possible 1990; Malatesta and Walkling, 1988; Sundaramurthy, 1992) . sources of the announcement of the antitakeover provision adoption.
The level of INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP may also have an impact on stock reactions to antitakeover proposals (Brickley, Lease, and Independent variables Smith, 1994) . Large institutional investors have more at stake in the firm, and thus their optimal The independent monitoring of the board is measured in three ways. The first is the proportion of monitoring expenses will increase the probability of institutional investors uncovering the intended outsiders (not current or previous executives of the firm or its subsidiaries) on the board motive for the antitakeover provision (Allen, 1993; Kochhar and Parthiban, 1996) . Conse-used [IND85, IND86, IND87, and IND88 for measures adopted in 1985-88, respectively] . The quently, it is expected that the negative stockholder wealth effect of antitakeover proposals will stock price effect in 1984 is captured in the intercept term. Mahoney and Mahoney (1993) be less for firms with larger institutional ownership (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Brickley, found time-effects in that the market reacted more negatively to provisions adopted in the 1980s Lease, and Smith, 1988; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987) . Therefore, the current paper controls for than to those adopted earlier. Extending this logic, one would expect the effects of the four dummy institutional stock ownership. Institutional stock ownership is measured as a percentage of total variables to be negative and significant.
Two additional control variables obtained from equity (Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; Davis and Thompson, 1994; Graves, 1988;  Hansen and the IRRC data base are used: the number of provisions that the firm had adopted before the Hill, 1991). Data on institutional ownership are obtained from the Standard and Poor's Stock current provision [NUMBER PREVIOUSLY ADOPTED] , and the number of provisions Guide in the month-end prior to the antitakeover provision announcement.
adopted along with the current provision [NUMBER CURRENTLY ADOPTED]. It is Size is included as a control variable since antitakeover provisions may be particularly effec-possible that the market may react more negatively to provisions adopted by a firm that has tive for discouraging takeovers of large firms (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990) . If size several other provisions in place. Similarly, the market may react more negatively to provisions [MARKET VALUE OF EQUITY] is not controlled for, then a correlated variable (such as adopted simultaneously in the same proxy year than to those adopted individually. insider ownership or institutional ownership) may appear significantly related to the antitakeover Finally, two dummy variables are used to control for the effects of the type of antitakeover provision, but the relationship would be purely spurious.
provision. One captures the effects of the proposal of only corporate charter amendments [NONLang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) show that firms with high book equity/market equity gain POISON PILL INDICATOR]. The second captures the effects of the combination of a poison the most in tender offers, and therefore have the most to lose if a firm's managers initiate an pill and corporate charter amendments [MIXED INDICATOR] . Finally, the effects of a poison antitakeover provision in order to entrench themselves. Due to this relationship, firms with high pill exclusively are captured in the intercept term.
Consistent with the logic of Walsh and Seward book/market value will in general suffer the greatest losses from the passage of antitakeover (1990), it is posited that stockholders are likely to react more negatively to poison pills than to provisions. The inclusion of the book equity/market equity [EQUITY BOOK/ other provisions. Thus, one would expect the coefficient on the NON-POISON PILL INDI-MARKET] controls for this effect. The market value of equity is determined using CRSP's CATOR to be positive and significant. No specific prediction is made for MIXED INDICATOR. shares outstanding and stock price. Book value of equity is taken from COMPUSTAT, using the (fiscal) year-end prior to the announcement of Empirical analysis the antitakeover provision. This paper also controls for whether the firm To test the relationship between board structure and market reactions to the adoption of antitakepassing an antitakeover provision was rumored to be a target [TAKEOVER INDICATOR], accord-over provisions, the standardized cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) of firms in the ing to the Wall Street Journal Index (Singh and Harianto, 1989b) . Previous research finds that sample are regressed on board composition, leadership, and control variables. Methodologies firms under takeover threat experienced more negative stock price reactions to the announce-based on the market model using ordinary least squares (OLS) and using standard parametric tests ment of antitakeover provisions (Lauterbach et al., 1991; Ryngaert, 1988) . are well specified under a variety of conditions for daily stock return data (Brown and Warner, To control for the year of adoption of provisions (1984-88) , four dummy variables are 1985; Peterson, 1989 
RESULTS
interesting results. Inside ownership and institutional ownership appear to have no (linear) This paper regresses the cross-sectional variation in the stock price reaction on the independent relationship with stock price reaction to antitakeover provisions. This paper's result of no statistivariables described above. The correlations of independent variables are reported in Table 1 . The correlations reported in Table 1 indicator is not a problem in the sample. HowHowever, Ryngaert (1988) is found among the control variables. Therefore, 4 In cross-sectional regressions of residuals on firm-specific several specifications for the regressions were independent variables, some authors (e.g., Brickley, Coles and Terry, 1994) use the standardized residuals while others (e.g., implemented to ensure the robustness of our McWilliams, 1990) use the unstandardized residuals. The results to this multicollinearity. Table 2 reports current paper reports the results from the standardized residual the results of the complete model used in the regressions, and the tests were rerun using the unstandardized residuals, with and without adjusting for heteroskedastic error regression analyses which are used to test terms (White, 1980) . The signs and significance levels of the Hypotheses 1 and 2. 3, 4 coefficients were virtually identical under all methodologies. Since the dependent variable is the standardized residual from the market model, the interpretation of the magnitude of the 3 For the current sample, significantly negative CARs and fraction negative for the entire sample at the 0.01 level using coefficient relies more on a statistical interpretation than an economic interpretation. a two-tailed test are robust to various event windows (e.g., (−50, +5), (−10, +5), (−2, +5)). For poison pills, significantly 5 All results in Table 2 including the negative effects of OUTSIDER PERCENTAGE were robust to the inclusion or negative CARs and fraction negative at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed test are robust to various windows (e.g., (−50, exclusion of its significantly correlated independent variable PRE-CEO OUTSIDER PERCENTAGE. +5), (−10, +5), (−5, +5)). There were mixed empirical results testing Walsh and prediciton that poison 6 Because poison pills differ significantly from antitakeover charter amendments in the sense that poison pills do not pills will have significantly greater negative stock price reactions than nonoperating antitakeover amendments that require require shareholder approval, we ran the analysis with only firms amending their corporate charter. The results with stockholder approval (e.g., supermajority amendments, classified board provisions, fair-price amendments, reduction in respect to board structure variables are robust to the inclusion or exclusion in the sample of the poison pills. cumulative voting, and anti-greenmail provisions). While this cally significant stock price effect of inside own-suggests that the market may regard antitakeover provisions adopted by large firms to be partiership and institutional ownership is consistent with the findings of Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) , cularly effective in lowering the probability of a takeover. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) and Lauterbach et al. (1991) but runs counter to the findings of Firms with larger book equity/market equity (and therefore probably performing poorly due to McWilliams (1990) .
Large firms (where agency problems may be inefficiency) also receive a more negative (and statistically significant) stock market reaction greater) receive a more negative (and statistically significant) stock market response upon adoption upon adoption of antitakeover provisions. These firms empirically have the most to gain (via of antitakeover provisions. This empirical result Table 2 . Regression of stock price reaction to firm contrary to the findings of Ryngaert (1988) and characteristics. Lauterbach et al. (1991) .
Regarding the dummy variables used to control Previous research on antitakeover provisions F-value for regression 2.63*** As expected, the market reacts less negatively In order to find what characteristics of firms affect stock price to antitakeover provisions adopted by boards with reaction, the standardized cumulative average abnormal returns a chairperson who is not the CEO than to antiof firms in this paper's sample are regressed on observable takeover provisions adopted by boards chaired by firm characteristics. the CEO. Several board reformists have advocated *Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using a two-tailed test.
the value of separating the positions of CEO **Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% and chairperson of the board because it enables level, using a two-tailed test.
chairpersons to perform their governance roles ***Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using a two-tailed test. more effectively. Whether such a board structure actually adds to board independence, or is simply perceived as better able to protect shareholder interests, the market reacts more negatively to larger takeover premiums) in a takeover (Davis and Stout, 1992; Lang et al., 1989) .
The dummy variable indicating whether the 7 Rerunning the analysis for poison pills alone indicates no firm is a takeover target does not enter as signifi-time trend effects in the reaction to poison pill adoptions in the 1984-88 period.
cant in the regression. This empirical result is antitakeover provisions adopted by boards in may be that since stockholder activists have sought and achieved to a considerable extent which the CEO and chairperson positions are held by one individual. Thus, the market seems increased outsider representation on corporate boards, the market has had an opportunity to to take the monitoring role of the chairperson into account in its reaction to antitakeover pro-gauge the actual contribution of outsiders in practice, which runs contrary to agency theory expecvisions. This result is consistent with Kesner and Johnson's (1990) finding that corporate boards tations. This paper's empirical finding is consistent with Singh and Harianto's conclusion that which are led by a chairperson other than the CEO tend to be sued less often. These findings 'adding outsiders to corporate boards is misplaced. Activitists seeking to add outsiders have endorse the value of approval of board actions by (presumably) a more impartial chairperson. presumed that the latter are objective and independent; our finding can be interpreted as refuting Moreover, this result indicates that the monitoring effect of such a chairperson can substitute some-the basis of this activism ' (1989a: 21) .
A fourth possible explanation may relate to what for the external takeover market which is restricted by antitakeover provisions. Evidence of using a proportion of outsiders on the board as a measure of board vigilance. Prior findings of such substitution between internal and external governance mechanisms is complementary to the the effects of outsider representation on other governance issues are inconclusive. For instance, findings of Rediker and Seth (1995) and Sundaramurthy (1996) concerning substitution between some studies indicate that increased outsider representation has positive outcomes such as reducgovernance mechanisms.
8
The market reacts more negatively to antitake-ing the probability of a firm paying greenmail (Kosnik, 1987) or being subject to shareholder over provisions adopted by outsider-dominated boards than to antitakeover provisions adopted by suits (Kesner and Johnson, 1990) . On the other hand, some studies indicate negative outcomes boards with fewer outsiders. This empirical finding is contrary to agency theory expectations. such as reduced R&D spending (Baysinger et al., 1991) and increased probability of a firm adopting Furthermore, it indicates that the market not only does not take into account the monitoring role of golden parachutes for its executives (Cochran et al., 1985; Singh and Harianto, 1989a) . Other outsiders but actually discounts their presence. One explanation is that outside directors are more studies indicate that outsider representation is not related to outcomes such as corporate illegal acts likely to be aligned with top management than with shareholders (Gordon and Pound, 1993; (Kesner, Victor, and Lamont, 1986) . While this study's more fine-grained measure of outsiders to Mace, 1986) .
A second possible explanation is that when the some extent captures outside board members' intent to monitor because of the potential indeboard has almost no outside directors, the stock market can already suspect that the board will pendence associated with their nomination to the board prior to that of the CEO's, it does not resist takeover offers. Thus, the announcement of an antitakeover provision conveys mostly positive gauge the capacity of these members to actually monitor. Other influences affecting board indeinformation that an offer, which might succeed despite board opposition, is more likely. In con-pendence (e.g., other contractual connections, board members' educational background, knowltrast, when the board has several outside directors, the announcement of an antitakeover provision edge of the industry, and experience on other corporate boards) may be vital in determining may have a greater negative information effect. Thus, firms with more outside directors may ability to monitor effectively corporate managements (Daily and Dalton, 1994 ; Seward and experience a greater negative reaction to antitakeover provision adoption (Brickley et al., 1994) . Walsh, 1996) . The major concern here is measurement error-it is difficult to distinguish A third possible explanation for this finding well-aligned and poorly aligned board members. Note, however, that the separate CEO-8 In addition, there may be substitution effects between com-chairperson variable is not subject to the same pany-enacted antitakeover provisions and state statutes limiting measurement error problem. takeover activity (Herzel and Shepro, 1990; Mahoney, 1994) .
This paper's empirical results thus indicate that
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while separating the chairperson and CEO po-sitions is valued in terms of its potential to those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New increase board independence, increased outsider representation is viewed less favorably. These York or the Federal Reserve System. empirical results indicate that the market is cognizant of changes to the corporate board that can substitute for the monitoring effects of the REFERENCES takeover market. Agrawal, A. and G. N. Mandelker (1990) actions such as adoption of antitakeover pro-Baysinger, B. D., R. H. Kosnik and T. A. Turk (1991) . visions.
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